Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between
February 18, 2013 and September 4, 2013. This collection, written by
the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting
point.
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CIVIL
ANTITRUST
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act – Notice Requirements; Hooks v.
Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether a consumer debtor is required to
dispute the validity of a debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) in writing,
although that section does not state that a writing is required. Id. at 284.
The court noted that while the 3rd “Circuit has held that a notice
imposing a writing requirement does not violate § 1692g, . . . the [9th]
Circuit has held that it does.” Id. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 9th
Circuit, finding that “[t]he language of § 1692g(a)(3) does not
incorporate the writing requirement included specifically in other
sections of the same statute” and that there was “no reason to ignore this
difference in statutory language.” Id. at 286. Thus, the 2nd Circuit
concluded that § 1692g(a)(3) does not impose a writing requirement. Id.
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BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11 – Avoidance of Rights and Limits; In re Quebecor World
(USA) Inc., 719 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2013)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether “a transfer may qualify for the
section 546(e) safe harbor even if the financial intermediary is merely a
conduit.” Id. at 99. The court noted that the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Circuits
“concluded that the plain language [of section 546(e)] includes any
transfer to a financial institution, even if it is only serving as a conduit or
intermediary.” Id. In contrast, the 11th Circuit held that “the financial
institution must acquire a beneficial interest in the transferred funds or
securities for the safe harbor to apply.” Id. The court reasoned that
“[t]he plain language of the statute refers to transfers made ‘by or to (or
for the benefit of)’ a financial institution,” and therefore “a transfer may
be either ‘for the benefit of’ a financial institution or ‘to’ a financial
institution, but need not be both.” Id. at 99–100. Thus, the 2nd Circuit
joined the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Circuits in holding that “a transfer may
qualify for the section 546(e) safe harbor even if the financial
intermediary is merely a conduit.” Id. at 99.
Appeals – Finality of Order Denying Proposed Bankruptcy Plan;
Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2013)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether “an order denying confirmation
of a proposed plan but not dismissing the underlying bankruptcy
petition” is an interlocutory or final order. Id. at 246. The court noted
that the 2nd, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits held that such orders are
interlocutory orders, while the 3rd and 5th Circuits held that such orders
“can be final for purposes of appeal.” Id. at 247. The court agreed with
the 3rd and 5th Circuits, finding their approach to be more pragmatic and
recognized that it is “all but compelled by considerations of practicality.”
Id. at 248. Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded that “a denial of confirmation
can be a final order for purposes of appeal even if the case has not yet
been dismissed.” Id.
Creditor Claims – Non-Spousal Inherited IRAs; In re Heffron-Clark,
714 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether a non-spousal inherited
individual retirement account (‘inherited IRA’ . . . ) is exempt” from
creditors’ claims in bankruptcy. Id. at 559. The court noted that the 5th
and 8th Circuits determined that successors to retirement accounts are
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entitled to treat those funds the same as the decedent. Id. at 560. The 7th
Circuit disagreed with the 5th and 8th Circuit’s reasoning because it
allowed debtors to shield money from creditors while retaining the
ability to use that money for consumption. Id. at 561. The court
distinguished inherited IRAs from other funds and assets that could be
protected from creditors. Id. at 560–62. Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded
that once the IRA was inherited, it ceased to be a retirement fund and
became a source for current consumption, and was not exempt from
creditors. Id. at 562.
Constitutional Authority Waiver & Consent – Objections to the
Constitutional Authority of Bankruptcy Courts; Wellness
International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether, based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), an objection to a
bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a
state law claim is waivable. Id. at 755. The court noted that “the 6th
Circuit held that a Stern objection to the bankruptcy court’s
constitutional authority is not waivable,” while the 9th Circuit held “that
a party’s Stern objection to a bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment
in a core proceeding is waivable . . . because Congress has authorized
litigants to consent to a bankruptcy judge’s final adjudication of a
noncore proceeding. Id. at 770, 772.
The court agreed with the 6th Circuit, finding that constitutional
objections to a bankruptcy court’s authority implicates both the personal
rights of the parties and the structural interests concerning separation of
powers such that the objection could not be waived. Id. at 771–72. Thus,
the 7th Circuit concluded “that under current law a litigant may not
waive an Article III, § 1, objection to a bankruptcy court’s entry of final
judgment in a core proceeding.” Id. at 773.
Judicial Estoppel – Prior Position Based on Inadvertence or
Mistake; Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Department of Transportation,
733 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 2013)1
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the judicial estoppel doctrine
should be applied where a debtor claims an initial filing error was based
on inadvertent or mistaken. Id. at *12. The court noted that the 3rd, 6th,
1
Specific Reporter pages were not assigned at the time of publication; pin cites
reflect Lexis page numbers. The Lexis cite is: Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Department of
Transportation, No. 10-16000, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15076 (9th Cir. July 24, 2013).
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and 8th Circuits determined that they must consider “whether the
plaintiff knew of the claims and had a motive to conceal them.” Id. at
*26. The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Circuits, stating
that “the ordinary understanding of ‘mistake’ and ‘inadvertence’ was a
more equitable and less confusing standard.” Id. at *29. Thus, the 9th
Circuit concluded that “knowledge of the pending claim and the
universal motive to conceal a potential asset” are factors which may be
considered by a court, but “[t]he relevant inquiry is, more broadly, the
plaintiff’s subjective intent when filling out and signing the bankruptcy
schedules.” Id.
Chapter 7 – Automatic Stays; Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031 (10th
Cir. 2013)
The 10th Circuit considered “whether allegedly fraudulently
transferred property is subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay
before a trustee recovers the property through an avoidance action.” Id.
at 1032. The court noted that the 5th Circuit “has held that fraudulently
transferred property belongs to the estate under [11 U.S.C.] § 541(a)(1),
and is therefore subject to § 362’s stay even before it is recovered.” Id.
at 1037. In contrast, the 2nd Circuit held that allegedly fraudulently
transferred “property does not become part of the estate until it is
recovered.” Id. at 1038. The court stated that “although § 541 is very
broad, it plainly does not include fraudulently transferred property until
that property is recovered.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, the
10th Circuit held “that fraudulently transferred property is not part of the
bankruptcy estate until recovered.” Id. at 1039.
Automatic Stay – Tax Deficiency Appeals; Schoppe v. Commissioner,
711 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2013)
The 10th Circuit addressed “whether the automatic bankruptcy stay
in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) would apply to” an appeal on tax deficiencies.
Id at 1191. The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 11th Circuits
determined that § 362 does not stay an appeal when “the proceeding
before the Tax Court was brought by the debtor.” Id at 1192. In
contrast, the 9th Circuit held that an appeal was a continuation of the
proceeding “which is initiated by IRS administrative proceedings against
the taxpayer.” Id. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and
11th Circuits and applied the bright-line rule that “a petition filed in Tax
Court is an independent judicial proceeding initiated by the debtor, not
the continuation of an administrative proceeding against the debtor.” Id.
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Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that the automatic bankruptcy stay in
§ 362 does not apply to an appeal on tax deficiencies. Id.
Chapter 7 – Involuntary Petition Dismissal; In re Piazza, 719
F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013)
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether prepetition bad faith
constitutes ‘cause’ to dismiss involuntarily a Chapter 7 petition under [11
U.S.C.] § 707(a).” Id. at 1260. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and
6th Circuits permit a § 707(a) dismissal based on bad faith, while the 8th
and 9th Circuits have held that “although many grounds for dismissal
under § 707(a) may be characterized as ‘bad faith,’ ‘bad faith’ should not
be a freestanding ‘cause’ for dismissal.” Id. at 1260 n.3. The court
reasoned that if “bankruptcy courts may sanction litigants for filing
documents with ‘any improper purpose,’” as well as “tak[e] any
action . . . necessary or appropriate . . . to prevent an abuse of process,”
the court saw “no reason why prepetition bad faith should not constitute
an adequate or sufficient reason for dismissal.” Id. at 1262. Thus, the
11th Circuit concluded that “the power to dismiss ‘for cause’ in § 707(a)
includes the power to involuntarily dismiss a Chapter 7 case based on
prepetition bad faith.” Id. at 1260–61.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Civil Action by Prisoner – Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA);
Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “failure to exhaust [i]s an
affirmative defense, so that a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is statutorily distinct from his failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” Id. at 456. The court noted that the 2nd,
4th, 7th, and 8th Circuits “treat failure to exhaust as an affirmative
defense, so that a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
statutorily distinct from his failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted,” while the 10th and 11th Circuits found that “failure to
exhaust constitutes a strike . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The court further noted that the D.C. Circuit “follows
neither the majority nor the minority approach,” but rather has
established a bright-line rule that “if the court dismisses an unexhausted
complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or if it dismisses the complaint sua
sponte and expressly declares the complaint fails to state a claim, the
dismissal counts as a strike.” Id. at 457 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court agreed with the D.C. Circuit in finding that dictum
in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) suggests that “the possibility that
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even when failure to exhaust is treated as an affirmative defense, it may
be invoked in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the complaint somehow reveals
the exhaustion defense on its face” consistent with 3rd Circuit precedent.
Id. at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 3rd Circuit
concluded that “dismissal based on a prisoner’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies does not constitute a PLRA strike, unless a court
explicitly and correctly concludes that the complaint reveals the
exhaustion defense on its face and the court then dismisses the
unexhausted complaint for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 460.
Antitrust & Trade Law – Clayton Act; KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global
Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether venue and service-of-process
provisions under Section 12 of the Clayton Act should be read as an
integrated whole or as two separate provisions. Id. at 724–25. The court
noted that the 3rd and 9th Circuits held that the Section’s clauses may be
decoupled, taking what might be termed the “independent” view of
Section 12, while the 2nd and D.C. Circuits held that Section 12’s venue
and service-of-process provisions must be read together. Id. at 726–28.
The 7th Circuit agreed with the 2nd and D.C. Circuits in finding that the
provision must be read together but without relying on the “plain
meaning” rationale endorsed by the 2nd and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 730.
Instead, the 7th Circuit reasoned that “the practical effects of decoupling
the clauses of Section 12 are ultimately too bizarre and contrary to
Congress’s apparent intent . . . .” Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that
Section 12 must be read as an integrated whole. Id.
CONSUMER LAW
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) – Statutory Time Bar; Kerian v. Home
Capital, 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013)
The 8th Circuit addressed whether “inform[ing] the lender [in
writing], within three years [(of the consummation of their loan
transactions)] of . . . intent to rescind” preserves a plaintiff’s right to
rescission under the TILA. Id. at 726. The court noted that the 3rd and
4th Circuits have held “giving the creditor written notice, in any form,
was enough to satisfy the statue of repose,” while the 9th and 10th
Circuits have held that “rescission suits must be brought within three
years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of
rescission is delivered within that three year period.” Id. at 726–27
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(internal quotation marks omitted). The court agreed with the 9th and
10th Circuit’s reasoning based on “[t]he nature of a statute of repose and
the remedy of rescission, in addition to the uncertainties as to title that
would likely occur if the right is not effectuated by court filing within
three years of the underlying transaction.” Id. at 728. Thus, the 8th
Circuit held that “a plaintiff seeking rescission must file suit, as opposed
to merely giving the bank notice, within three years in order to preserve
that right pursuant to [TILA].” Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Recess Appointment Clause – Recess Defined; NLRB v. Enterprise
Leasing Company Southeast, LLC, 722 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2013)
The 4th Circuit considered whether the term “recess” in the Recess
Appointment Clause of the United States Constitution included
intersession breaks and intrasession breaks. Id. at 646–47. The court
noted that the 2nd, 9th, and 11th Circuits have defined the term “recess”
to include “intersession breaks as well as intrasession breaks,” while the
3rd and D.C. Circuits defined “recess” as “intersession breaks.” Id. The
court found that the interpretation of the D.C. and 3rd Circuits “adhere[d]
to the plain language of the Appointments and Recess Appointments
Clauses, and is consistent with the structure of the Constitution, the
history behind the enactment of these clauses, and the recess
appointment practice of at least the first 132 years” of the nation. Id at
652. Thus, the 4th Circuit agreed with the 3rd and D.C. Circuits and held
that the term “recess” refers to intersession breaks. Id.
CONTRACTS
Maritime Law – Scope of Safe Berth Warranty; Shipping Co. v. Citgo
Asphalt Refining Co., 718 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “the safe berth warranty is an
express assurance made without regard to the amount of diligence taken
by the charterer.” Id. at 203. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit “has
long held that promising a safe berth effects an ‘express assurance’ that
the berth will be as represented,” while the 5th Circuit found “that a safe
berth warranty merely imposes upon the charterer a duty of due diligence
to select a safe berth.” Id. at 201. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 2nd
Circuit finding that “an express assurance warranty is most consistent
with industry custom.” Id. The court disagreed with the 5th Circuit’s
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due diligence legal framework because the court found “it would make
contractual language explicitly adopting a due diligence metric
pointless.” Id. at 203. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded “that the safe
berth warranty is an express assurance made without regard to the
amount of diligence taken by the charterer.” Id.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) – Statutory Interpretation: Trinity
Industries Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 12-2059, 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17286 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013)
The 3rd Circuit considered “whether CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B)
provides a contribution claim where the party seeking contribution has
settled its state-law liability (as opposed to its liability under
CERCLA) . . . .” Id. at *7. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit held that
“§ 113(f)(3)(B) claims create a contribution right only when liability for
CERCLA claims, rather than some broader category of legal claims, is
resolved.” Id. at *9. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
disagreed with the 2nd Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, finding that
“[t]he statutory language of § 113(f)(3)(B) requires only the existence of
a settlement resolving liability to the United States or a state for some or
all of a response action.” Id. at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, the court reasoned that “Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not state
that the ‘response action’ in question must have been initiated pursuant
to CERCLA . . . .” Id. The court noted that “the legislative history that
the . . . [2nd] Circuit relied upon in reading the CERCLA-specific
requirement into § 113(f)(3)(B) actually concerns the enactment of a
different provision—§ 113(f)(1).” Id. at *12. Thus, the 3rd Circuit held
that “§ 113(f)(3)(B) does not require resolution of CERCLA liability in
particular.” Id. at *11.
EVIDENCE
Jury Voir Dire – Challenging a Verdict; Warger v. Shauers, 721 F.3d
606 (8th Cir. 2013)
The 8th Circuit considered whether juror dishonesty during voir
dire is grounds to challenge a verdict under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Id. at
611. The court noted that the 9th Circuit held that “statements by jurors
regarding dishonesty during voir dire may be admitted into evidence for
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the purpose of challenging a verdict.” Id. In contrast, the 3rd and 10th
Circuits held that trial courts may exclude such evidence because the
Fed. R. Evid. “categorically bar juror testimony as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of jury deliberations even if the
testimony is not offered to explore the jury’s decision-making process in
reaching the verdict.” Id. at 611–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court agreed with the 3rd and 10th Circuits, finding that allowing
“juror testimony through the backdoor of voir dire challenge risks
swallowing the rule. A broad question during voir dire could then justify
the admission of any number of jury statements that would now be recharacterized as challenges to voir dire rather than challenges to the
verdict.” Id. at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 8th
Circuit concluded that juror testimony that shows a failure to answer
honestly during voir dire cannot be used to overturn a verdict. Id.
HEALTH LAW
The Affordable Care and Patient Protection Acts (PPACA) –
Survivor Benefits; U.S. Steel Mining Co., LLC v. Director, 719 F.3d
1275 (11th Cir. 2013)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether, under 30 U.S.C. § 932(l), as
amended by PPACA, a survivor seeking benefits based on automatic
entitlement is required “to prove that the miner spouse died due to
pneumoconiosis.” Id. at 1280. The court noted that the 3rd and 4th
Circuits held that the amended § 932(l) “removed the need for a
surviving spouse to prove what caused the miner’s death,” while the 6th
Circuit concluded that surviving spouses must still prove that the miner
died of pneumoconiosis. Id. The 11th Circuit agreed with the 3rd and
4th Circuits and reasoned that interpreting the term “eligible survivors”
not to require a showing that the miner died due to pneumoconiosis,
allows the statute to be interpreted in a way that does not render § 932(l)
“an altogether meaningless repetition of the existing requirements for
obtaining survivors’ benefits.” Id. Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that
a survivor is only required to show the appropriate relational and
dependency requirements to be considered an “eligible survivor” and is
not required to show that the miner died due to pneumoconiosis. Id. at
1284.
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IMMIGRATION
Asylum – Social Group; Cece v. Holder, No. 11-1989, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16533 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether an asylum petitioner having a
“common and immutable characteristic of being (1) young, (2) Albanian,
(3) women, (4) living alone” is “a particular social group that is
cognizable under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A),” the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Id. at *8, 19. The 7th Circuit agreed with the Board of
Immigration Appeals in finding social groups are “limit[ed] to groups
whose membership is defined by a characteristic that is either immutable
or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that a person
ought not be required to change.” Id. at *10. The court disagreed with
the 6th Circuit’s finding “that the social group of young (or those who
appear to be young), attractive Albanian women who are forced into
prostitution does not constitute a social group because it is circularly
defined by the fact that it suffers persecution.” Id. at *19 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that
“characteristics of the group consist[ing] of the immutable or
fundamental traits of being young, female, and living alone in Albania”
is sufficient to qualify as a particular social group cognizable under the
Immigration
and
Nationality
Act.
Id.
at
*17.
Denaturalization Proceedings – Standard of Review; Mondaca-Vega v.
Holder, 718 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2013)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the clearly erroneous standard of
review should apply to a district court’s factual findings in proceedings
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). Id. at 1078. The 9th Circuit noted
that the 1st Circuit found the “clearly erroneous” standard inappropriate
when reviewing the “district court’s factual findings in a denaturalization
proceeding.” Id. at 1081 n.3. The court found the reasoning of the 1st
Circuit unpersuasive and disagreed with its prior decision in Lim v.
Mitchell, 431 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1970) compelling de novo review. The
court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “52(a)
unambiguously requires that, in an action thus tried by the court instead
of a jury, the court ‘finds facts specially’ and that on review, those
factual findings be set aside only if ‘clearly erroneous.’” Id. at 1080.
Thus, 9th Circuit concluded that the “clearly erroneous” standard should
apply to district court’s factual findings in citizenship proceedings. Id. at
1083.
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LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – Standard of
Review; Gross v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, No. 12-1175, 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 17059 (1st Cir. Aug. 16, 2013)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether “‘the satisfactory to us’ wording
[of an ERISA benefit’s policy], without more, fail[s] to meet the
requisite . . . minimum clarity necessary to shift [review of an ERISA
plan’s administrator’s denial of an employee’s claim for benefits] from
de novo to deferential review.” Id. at *37–39 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court noted that the 10th and 8th Circuits determined that
“the use of ‘to us’ after ‘satisfactory’ [is] an indicator of subjective,
discretionary authority on the part of the administrator, distinguishing
such phrasing from policies that simply require ‘satisfactory proof’ of
disability, without specifying who must be satisfied,” while the 6th
Circuit found “that discretionary review is triggered by a requirement of
‘satisfactory proof’ without specification of who must be satisfied.” Id.
at *28. The 1st Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 7th, and 9th Circuits in
finding that “the ‘satisfactory to us’ wording, without more, will
ordinarily fail to meet the requisite if minimum clarity necessary to shift
from de novo to deferential review.” Id. at *37–38. Thus, the 1st Circuit
concluded that “no precise words are required.” Id. at *38.
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – Long Term
Disability (LTD) Benefits Plan; Thurber v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,
712 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2013)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether insurers in “subrogation-like
actions . . . under an ERISA plan” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)
must identify the particular fund from which they seek reimbursement
and whether it matters that the funds sought have dissipated. Id. at 661.
The court noted that the 1st Circuit held “that an insurer need not identify
a specific account in which the funds are kept” and the 3rd Circuit held
“that dissipation of funds is immaterial if an equitable lien by agreement
is in place.” Id. at 663 (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast,
the 9th Circuit held that fiduciaries must identify specific funds the
beneficiary still possesses. Id. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 1st and
3rd Circuits in finding that there is no “basis for distinguishing between
certain ‘funds’ identified by ERISA plans.” Id. at 664. The court
“reject[ed] the [9th] Circuit’s . . . view that insurers may not reach
specifically identified assets that have dissipated.” Id. Thus, the 2nd
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Circuit concluded that an insurer’s claim sounds in equity when it seeks
“return of property over which it asserts a lien” and “whether or not the
beneficiary remains in possession of those particular dollars is not
relevant as long as she was on notice that the funds under her control
belonged to the insurer; she held the money in a constructive trust.” Id.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – Fiduciary
Duty; Edmonson v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 725 F.3d 406
(3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether an issuer of a life insurance plan
violates its fiduciary duties under ERISA when it uses retained asset
accounts for the benefit of an employee-beneficiary. Id. at 420. The
court noted that the 2nd Circuit determined that “the use of a retained
asset account did not violate ERISA when the insurance policy provided
for it,” while the 1st Circuit determined that “the use of a retained asset
account did violate ERISA when the insurance policy required a lump
sum payment.” Id. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit in
finding that an issuer of a life insurance plan is no longer acting as a
fiduciary “once it satisfied its obligation to pay the benefits [to the
employee-beneficiary],” and thus, “it was no longer managing or
administering the plan.” Id. at 424–25. Thus, the 3rd Circuit held that
the insurer of the life insurance plan “did not breach its fiduciary duties
under ERISA when it chose to pay [the employee-beneficiary] with a
retained asset account.” Id. at 429.
Civil Rights Act Title VII – “Employee” Definition; Juino v.
Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a volunteer is an “employee”
within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at
432. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, and 11th “Circuits have
adopted the threshold-remuneration test” to determine whether a
volunteer can be deemed an employee for purposes of the Act. Id. at
435. This test requires a court to “conduct a two-step inquiry by
requiring that volunteer first show remuneration as a threshold matter
before proceeding to the second step—analyzing the putative
employment relationship under the common law agency test.” Id. at 435.
The court also noted that “the [6th] and [9th] Circuits view remuneration
as only one . . . nondispositive factor in conjunction with other common
law agency test factors.” Id. The court agreed with the 2nd, 4th, 8th,
10th, and 11th Circuits, finding that the threshold-remuneration test is
“uniquely suited to assessing a plausible employment relationship within
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the volunteer context.” Id. at 439. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that for
purposes of establishing an employer-employee relationship, “a
volunteer is distinguishable from the employee-independent contractor
situation because there is a prerequisite of a ‘hire’ in the latter.” Id.
Longshore & Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (LHWCA) –
Situs Requirement; New Orleans Depot Services. v. Director, Office of
Worker’s Compensation Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013).
The 5th Circuit addressed whether the term “adjoining navigable
waters” in the LHWCA’s situs requirement includes locations that adjoin
waters based on a functional relationship or only includes locations that
physically adjoin waters. Id. at 389. The 5th Circuit noted that the 3rd
and 9th Circuits have held that “[t]he phrase ‘adjoining area’ should be
read to describe a functional relationship that does not in all cases depend
on physical contiguity,” while the 4th Circuit has held that “[t]he plain
language of the LHWCA requires that covered situses actually ‘adjoin’
navigable waters, not that they merely be in ‘the general proximity’ of
the waterfront. Id. at 390–91. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 4th
Circuit’s reasoning that a narrow definition was “more faithful to the
plain language of statute.” Id. at 394. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded
that “adjoining navigable water[s] . . . mean[s] [to] border on or be
contiguous with navigable waters.” Id. at 393–94 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
SECURITIES
Rule 13b2-2 – Scienter Requirement; SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th
Cir. 2013)
The 8th Circuit considered whether the SEC, in a civil enforcement
action against a former corporate officer for allegedly making materially
false or misleading statements to accountants, was required to show that
the officer acted “knowingly” in violation of SEC Rule 13b2-2. Id. at
954. The court noted that “[t]he [2nd] and [7th] Circuits have stated
generally, that section 13(b) of the Exchange Act does not impose a
scienter requirement. that, as a general matter, § 13(b) of the Exchange
Act does not impose a knowledge requirement. Id. & n.8. In contrast,
the 9th Circuits held that to be liable under 13b2-2, “one must knowingly
make false statements.” Id. at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court reasoned that “[a]pplying section 13(b)(5)’s knowing
requirement to Rule 13b2-2 conflicts with the plain language of the
statute: criminal liability triggers section 13(b)(5)’s knowing requirement

162

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:145

under section 13(b)(4), indicating that it is otherwise not an element of a
civil claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also
reasoned that the SEC has found that 13b2-2 does not contain a scienter
requirement and that “it is well established that an agency’s construction
of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.” Id. at 956 &
n.13. Thus, the 8th Circuit held that the SEC was only required to show
negligence in making materially false or misleading statements to
accountants under Rule 13b2-2. Id. at 955.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
False Claims Act (FCA) – First-to-File Rule; United States ex rel.
Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013)
The 1st Circuit considered whether the FCA’s first-to-file rule
“requires a first-filed complaint to meet the heightened pleading standard
of Rule 9(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to bar a later-filed
complaint.” Id. at 29–30. The court noted that the D.C. Circuit
determined “a complaint need not satisfy Rule 9(b) requirements to serve
as a preclusive first-filed complaint under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5),” while
the 6th Circuit “imposed Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard on
first-filed complaints . . . .” Id. at 34, 37 n.10. The court agreed with the
D.C. Circuit, finding that the first-to-file bar served to provide the
government with sufficient notice as to the alleged fraud while also
deterring opportunistic whistle-blowers. Id. 35–36. The court found the
6th Circuit’s reasoning “that failing to impose Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirements on earlier-filed complaints under § 3730(b)(5) would
encourage would-be qui tam relators to file overly broad, vague and
speculative complaints simply to prevent other potential relators from
filing more-detailed complaint” unpersuasive. Id. at 38. Thus, the 1st
Circuit concluded that “for the purposes of the first-to-file rule, the
earlier-filed complaint need not meet the heightened pleading standard of
Rule 9(b) . . . [rather] earlier-filed complaints must provide only the
essential facts to give the government sufficient notice to initiate an
investigation into allegedly fraudulent practices.” Id. at 36–37.
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CRIMINAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Sex Offender and Registration Notification Act (SORNA) – Notice
and Comment Requirements; United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498
(3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “the Attorney General had good
cause to waive the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice and
comment requirements in promulgating a rule governing the retroactivity
of . . . [SORNA’s] registration requirements.” Id. at 502. The court
noted that the 4th and 11th Circuits have held that the Attorney General’s
justifications are sufficient to waive the notice and comment
requirements of the APA, while the 5th, 6th, and 9th Circuits have held
that they are not. Id. at 509. The court agreed with the 5th, 6th, and 9th
Circuits in finding that the Attorney General’s stated justifications of
eliminating any possible uncertainty whether SORNA applied
retroactively and protecting the public from sex offenders who fail to
register creating practical dangers were insufficient and would
“eviscerate the APA’s notice and comment requirements.” Id. at 509.
Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that the “Interim Rule did not provide
sufficient justification to constitute good cause for the waiver of notice
and comment.” Id. at 514.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Search and Seizure – Malicious Prosecution; Hernandez-Cuevas v.
Taylor, 723 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2013)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether an individual alleging unlawful
conduct of law enforcement officers while being held in custody during
pretrial detention without probable cause, “states a Fourth Amendment
claim actionable through a Bivens suit.” Id. at 93. The court noted that
the 4th, 5th, 6th and 10th Circuits have “adopted a purely constitutional
approach, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate only a Fourth
Amendment violation.” Id. at 99. “The 2nd, 3rd, 9th and 11th Circuits,
on the other hand, have adopted a blended constitutional/common law
approach, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment
violation and all the elements of a common law malicious prosecution
claim.” Id. The court agreed with the 4th, 5th, 6th and 10th Circuits,
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indicating that because “the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
are not superseded by the common law,” there is no reason why a
plaintiff should have to establish every element of a common law claim.
Id. at 101. Thus, the 1st Circuit concluded that “the 4th Amendment
protection against seizures but upon probable cause does not end when
an arrestee becomes held pursuant to legal process and therefore an
individual does not lose his 4th Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure when he becomes detained pursuant to judicial
process.” Id. at 100.
Jury Charge – Entrapment Defense; United States v. Cromitie, 727
F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013)
The 2nd Circuit considered whether the second element of an
entrapment defense, that the defendant lacks a predisposition to engage
in criminal conduct, includes a positional inquiry the absence of which
provides a defense as a matter of law. Id. at 216–17. The court noted
that the 7th Circuit determined that “an entrapment defense succeeds as a
matter of law unless a defendant, whom government agents have induced
to commit an offense, is in a position without the government’s help to
become involved in illegal activity.” Id. at 216 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The 9th Circuit, in contrast, has rejected such a conclusion. Id
at 217. The court disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s finding that “[a]
person who has a pre-existing [criminal] design . . . or who promptly
agrees to play a part in such [criminal] activity should not escape
punishment just because he was not [otherwise] in a position to obtain”
the means to commit the intended crime. Id. Thus, the 2nd Circuit
rejected the expansion of the entrapment defense, concluding that”[t]he
Government need not leave [the defendant] at large until a real terrorist
[and not the informant] suggests such action and supplies real missiles.”
Id.
Habeas Corpus – Jurisdiction: United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165
(3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether a “sentencing court has
jurisdiction over 28 U.S.C. § 2255 preliminary matters before a formal
request for § 255 relief is filed.” Id. at 169. The court noted that the 2nd
Circuit has held that a district court does not have jurisdiction to rule on
such a § 2255 motion for an extension of time because “no case or
controversy exists until a formal request for §2255 relief is made.” Id.
The 3rd Circuit rejected this approach because it essentially
characterized “§ 2255 proceedings as civil actions separate from
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prisoners’ underlying criminal cases.” Id. Rather, the 3rd Circuit found
that a § 2255 proceeding “is a continuation of a [prisoner’s] federal
criminal case,” even though certain aspects “may be considered civil.”
Id. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that “under § 2255, a motion for an
extension of time can be decided prior to a formal request for relief
because the underlying prosecution satisfies Article III’s case or
controversy requirement.” Id.
Wiretapping Guidelines – Territorial Jurisdiction Limitation; United
States v. North, 728 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2013)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a district court’s lack of
territorial jurisdiction limitation in Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2516, mandates
suppression. Id. at 436. The court noted that the 2nd and 11th Circuits
determined that “the territorial jurisdiction limitation in Title III does not
directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit
the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigative device.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court disagreed with the 11th Circuit,
finding that “the territorial jurisdiction limitation serves important
substantive interests and implicates core concerns of the state, despite the
lack of legislative history.” Id. at 437. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded
that “[t]erritorial limitations on a district court directly implicate
Congress’s intent to guard against the unwarranted use of wiretapping.”
Id.
Appellate Review – Plain Error Definition; United States v. Remble,
520 Fed. Appx. 436 (6th Cir. 2013)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether error is measured at the time of
appeal “where the error was unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear
on appeal because the applicable law has been clarified.” Id. at 440. The
court noted that the 5th, 9th, and D.C. Circuits have held that Johnson v.
United States, 520 US 461 (1997) “provides a narrow exception to a
generally broad rule that error is plain only if it was clear at the time of
the district court’s ruling.” Id. In contrast, the 7th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits have held “that plain error is measured at the time of the appeal
regardless of where the law was settled at the time of trial.” Id. The
court agreed with the 7th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, finding that this
approach has the “advantage of avoiding the necessity of distinguishing
between cases in which ‘the law at the time of trial was settled and
clearly contrary to the law at the time of the appeal’ on one hand and
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cases in which was merely unsettled on the other.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that
“irrespective of whether the matter is settled at the time of trial or merely
at the time of the appeal an obvious and plain error is one that is clear
and uncontroverted at the time of the appeal.” Id. at 441 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Habeas Corpus – Petitions for Relief; Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d
583 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the savings clause of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) permits a prisoner to submit a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition under
a sentencing guidelines miscalculation claim when § 2255 is an
inadequate or ineffective remedy. Id. at 588. The court noted that the
11th Circuit determined that “savings clause relief is
unavailable . . . [because] the clause’s text does not . . . authorize[] the
filing of a § 2241 petition to remedy a miscalculation of the sentencing
guidelines that already has been, or may no longer be, raised
in a § 2255 motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 5th
Circuit “similarly disallowed federal prisoners from pursuing relief under
the savings clause when they challenge only their status as career
offenders, [because] . . . the savings clause is available only to prisoners
asserting actual innocence.” Id. The court disagreed with both the 11th
and 5th Circuits as “the text of the clause focuses on the legality of the
prisoner’s detention, . . . applicable where § 2255 remedy is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [a petitioner’s] detention . . . .” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 7th Circuit conclude[d] that
a petitioner may utilize the savings clause to “challenge the
misapplication of the sentencing guidelines, where the defendant was
sentenced in the pre–Booker era.” Id.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Warrantless Searches – Cell Phones; United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 2013)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether warrantless searches of cell
phones “were protecting officer safety and ensuring the preservation of
evidence.” Id. at 4. The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 7th Circuits
have found that warrantless cell phone data searches are valid, especially
for preserving evidence, but have employed different reasons for their
conclusions. Id. at 5. The 7th Circuit reasoned that “evidence
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preservation concerns outweighed the invasion of privacy at issue
because the search was minimally invasive.” Id. The court disagreed
and noted that modern day cell phones contain massive amounts of
personal information that “would previously have [been] stored in one’s
home and that would have been off-limits to officers performing a search
incident to arrest.” Id. at 8. The court further noted evidence
preservation was not a major concern because there are several methods
to prevent remote destruction of evidence stored on the cell phone. Id. at
10–11. The court observed that there are exceptions to “the warrant
requirement . . . that might justify a warrantless search of cell phone data
under the right conditions” including “where the phone is believed to
contain evidence necessary to locate a kidnapped child or to investigate a
bombing plot or incident.” Id. at 13. Thus, the 1st Circuit concluded that
“allowing the police to search [cell phone] data without a warrant any
time they conduct a lawful arrest” would constitute “a serious and
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.” Id. at 14
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Stored Communications Act (SCA) – Historical Cell Site
Information; In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013)
Issue 1; The 5th Circuit addressed whether a magistrate judge has
“discretion under the SCA to require the Government to seek a warrant
rather than a §2703(d) order to obtain historical cell cite information. Id.
at 606. The court noted the 3rd Circuit held that magistrates could
require a warrant instead of an order by interpreting the language of the
SCA to include permissive language and “that Congress’s use of this
phrase strongly implies court discretion.” Id. The court disagreed with
the 3rd Circuit’s reasoning because its “construction of the
SCA . . . ignores the intervening ‘shall’ in the provision.” Id. at 607.
Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that a court shall issue the order if the
government met the three necessary conditions in the statute. Id.
Issue: 2; The 5th Circuit addressed whether the cell site
information is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 608. The
court noted that the 3rd Circuit held that cell site information is protected
under the Fourth Amendment because the user only directly conveys the
number he dials and not the cell site information. Id. at 613. The court
disagreed, noting that the cellphone user “voluntary conveys his cell site
data each time he makes a call” because he selects “a particular service
provider, and to make call, and because he knows that the call conveys
cell site information.” Id. at 614. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that
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§ ”2703(d) orders to obtain historical cell cite information for specified
cell phones at the points at which the user places and terminates a call are
not categorically unconstitutional. Id. at 615.
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
False Statements – Intent; United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719 (7th
Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether specific intent is a requirement
for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1035. Id. at 739. The court noted that
the Supreme Court had previously not found specific intent to be
required under similar language within 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id. The court
stated that the 6th, 9th, and 11th Circuits have held that a finding of
specific intent to deceive the United States government is required to
convict someone under § 1001. Id. at 740 n.12. The 1st, 8th, and 10th
Circuits have no such requirement, and have held that willful was
nothing more than a requirement that, “the defendant knew that his
statement was false when he made it” or “that the defendant did the
forbidden act ‘deliberately and with knowledge.’” Id. Thus, the 7th
Circuit joined the 1st, 8th, and 10th Circuits in holding that “§ 1001
requires no intent to deceive” and that § 1035 must also be read to have
no such requirement. Id. at 741.
IMMIGRATION
Proof of Citizenship – Passport; United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255
(3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “[a] passport constitutes
conclusive proof of U.S. citizenship under 22 U.S.C. § 2705.” Id. at 257.
The court noted that the 3rd and 9th Circuits have held that § 2705
“establish[ed] that a valid passport is “conclusive proof of [United
States] citizenship.” Id. at 260. The court disagreed with the 9th
Circuit’s reasoning and its own prior reasoning because the
“interpretation . . . effectively reads the phrase ‘to a Citizen of the United
States’ out of the statute.” Id. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that
“because the text of § 2705 is unambiguous, . . . a passport is conclusive
proof of citizenship only if its holder was actually a citizen of the United
States when it was issued.” Id. at 261.
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Extrinsic Evidence Admissibility – Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude (CIMT); Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2013)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an Immigration Judge and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BOA) “may rely on evidence outside the
record to determine whether a petitioner has been convicted” of CIMTs
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (INA). Id. at 1200. Specifically at issue was the Attorney General’s
finding in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008) that
consideration of such extrinsic evidence was permissible. Id. The 3rd,
4th and 11th Circuits have rejected the conclusions in Silva-Trevino,
holding the Attorney General’s construction of “conviction”
incompatible with § 1227’s unambiguous definition requiring a “formal
judgment of guilt.” Id. at 1208. In contrast, the 7th and 8th Circuits both
permit the Immigration Judge to consider evidence outside the record of
conviction to determine whether an alien has been convicted of a CIMT.
Id. at 1209. Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 3rd, 4th, and 11th Circuits in
holding “the relevant provisions of the INA are not ambiguous” and that
the Immigration Judges and the BOA are not permitted to rely on
extrinsic evidence in finding prior convictions of CIMTs. Id.
SENTENCING
Federal Sentencing Act of 2010 – Rule of Lenity; United States v.
Savani, 716 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed how to resolve the “ambiguity in the
Sentencing Commission’s new definition of ‘applicable guideline
range’” in determining whether a sentencing court may apply a departure
provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 73. The court noted that
the 11th Circuit determined that a criminal defendant was not entitled to
a reduced sentence because the defendant’s original sentence was not
below the mandatory minimum. Id. at 76 n.6. The court disagreed with
the 11th Circuit’s decision because it “was based on an incorrect
interpretation of the phrase ‘applicable guidelines range’” and the
analysis failed to “address the use of ‘applicable guidelines range’ as it
appears in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).” Id. Rather the court found that the
Sentencing Commissions description of “applicable guideline range,”
contained within the revised Application Note 1(A) to the commentary of
§ 1B1.10, is a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute, such that
the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” Id. at 76.
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Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that the rule of lenity required this
ambiguity to be construed in favor of the defendant. Id.
Sentence Enhancement – Distribution of Pornographic Material;
United States v. Robinson, 714 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether, under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, a
sentencing judge must find that the defendant who downloaded child
pornography from a file-sharing program had knowledge or was reckless
in failing to discover that the files were also accessible to other
subscribers in order to render defendant a “distributor” of those files. Id.
at 468–69. The court noted that the 10th Circuit determined that the
distribution guidelines do not require that the defendant know of his
being a potential distributor of the files, while the 8th Circuit found there
must be proof that the defendant knew, or was reckless in failing to
discover, such files could be viewed online by other people. Id. at 468.
Thus, the 7th Circuit agreed with the 8th Circuit in finding that the
sentencing judge “must find that the defendant knew, or was reckless in
failing to discover, that the files he was downloading were accessible to
other individuals.” Id.
Sentence Enhancement – Liability for Death Cause by Drug Use;
United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit considered whether all members of a drug
conspiracy must be held strictly liable for death or serious bodily harm
that results from drugs supplied by the conspiracy under § 841(b)(1)(A)
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which imposes a minimum prison
sentence of twenty years. Id. at 831. The court noted that the “[1st] and
[8th] Circuits have described a defendant’s liability under this provision
as strict . . . .” Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In
contrast, the [9th] Circuit stop[ped] short of ascribing to the . . . strict
liability language used by other circuits” and held that “there may be
some fact scenarios in which the distribution of a controlled substance is
so removed and attenuated from the resulting death that criminal liability
could not be imposed . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court observed that the 6th Circuit has held that members of a conspiracy
should be subject to sentence enhancement only if the district court finds
the members are “part of the distribution chain that led to an individual’s
death.” Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court adopted
the 6th Circuit’s reasoning and held that “a district court must make
specific factual findings to determine whether each defendant’s relevant
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conduct encompasses the distribution chain that caused a victim’s death
before applying the twenty-year penalty.” Id. at 831.
Fraud – Loss Calculations; United States v. Torlai, 728 F.3d 932 (9th
Cir. 2013)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether government subsidies to farmers
for the acquisition of crop insurance should, in the context of a fraud
conviction, be considered a loss to the government for the purposes of
determining sentencing. Id. at 943. The court noted that the 7th Circuit
addressed this issue, holding that “if [a defendant] had [not been caught
committing fraud before the] payment [by the government], the
insurance company would have deducted the premium from the amount
of [defendant’s] claim” which would have reduced the loss by the
government. Id. at 944. The court disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s
finding, noting that it “overlooks basic economic realities and common
sense.” Id. The court reasoned that “[a] farmer must pay the crop
insurance producer premium regardless of whether an indemnity will be
paid . . . and the fact that a farmer can delay payment . . . does not negate
the farmer’s responsibility for the amount.” Id. 944–45. Thus, the 9th
Circuit held “whether the producer premium is paid when the policy is
purchased or whether the government subtracts the producer premium
from the indemnity paid, the government is in the same economic
position.” Id. at 946.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Bribery – Gratuities; United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2013)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) prohibits not
only bribes but also illegal gratuities. Id. at 22–23. The court first
clarified that § 666 prohibits the offering and accepting of something
with intent “to influence or reward.” Id. The court noted that the 2nd,
7th, and 8th Circuits treat a bribe, which requires a payor’s intent to
influence the official’s future conduct, as separate from a gratuity, which
requires a payor’s intent to reward past conduct. Id. at 23. In contrast,
the 4th Circuit reasoned that “the word ‘reward’ does not create a
separate gratuity offense in § 666,” but merely clarifies “that a bribe can
be promised before, but paid after, the official’s action on the payor’s
behalf.” Id. at 23. The 1st Circuit adopted the 4th Circuit’s view,
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finding that “influence” describes a situation where the payor makes a
prepayment to induce action, while “reward” portrays a promise of
payment, contingent upon the official’s act. Id. Thus, the 1st Circuit
concluded that gratuities are not criminalized under § 666. Id. at 26.
Smuggled Goods – Contrary to Law Definition; United States v.
Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2013)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether “the term ‘contrary to law’ as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 545 is limited to laws for the violation of which a
penalty is imposed.” Id. at 1181. The court noted that the 9th Circuit
adopted a narrow approach and determined that “regulations are included
within the definition of ‘law’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 545 only if
there is a statute (a ‘law’) that specifies that violation of that regulation is
a crime.” Id. at 1180. Conversely, the 4th Circuit determined that
“§ 545 criminalizes importation in violation of any regulation having the
force and effect of law.” Id. at 1181 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The 11th Circuit noted that the 9th Circuit’s “reasoning result[ed] in
complete rejection of regulatory law absent a coordinate criminal
statute.” Id. Thus, the 11th Circuit joined the 4th Circuit’s general
interpretation of “law,” and concluded that “there is nothing indicate that
the term ‘contrary to law’ as used in 18 U.S.C. § 545 is limited to laws
for the violation of which a penalty is imposed.” Id.

